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STUDYING BORROWER LEVEL RISK CHARACTERISTICS OF EDUCATION LOAN IN INDIA
Arindam BANDYOPADHYAY
The main objective of this paper is to study
the performance of education loans over
time and identify key risk factors of such
loans across various geographies and
constitutions. Using borrower level data of
5000 borrowers, from four major public
sector banks in India, this paper empirically
examines how education loan defaults and
losses are explained by various
characteristics associated with the loan
(loan amount, interest rate, repayment
period) and security positions (such as
margin given and security). Various
borrower characteristics such as age,
marital status, presence of guarantor or
co-borrowers also have been examined. A
set of univariate statistical tests as well as
multivariate logit and Tobit regression
techniques have been used to ﬁnd out the
answers. The empirical ﬁndings suggest that
borrower defaults on education loan
payments are mainly inﬂuenced by security,
borrower margin and repayment periods.
Borrowers with security cover are 1.5 times
more likely to remain solvent than those
without securities. A 10 percent increase in
borrower margin (BMARGIN) decreases the
odds of default (PD/PS) by 9.18 percent.
The presence of a guarantor or co-borrower
and collateral security signiﬁcantly
increases the chances of loan recovery and
hence reduces default loss rates. Moreover,
the socioeconomic characteristics of
borrowers and their regional locations also
act as important factors associated with
education loan defaults. The paper suggests
that strengthening borrower risk assessment
techniques, portfolio monitoring, due
diligence in lending, and institute
performance measures can reduce credit
risk in education loans. Merit,
employability, and reputation of
institutions should matter in loan appraisal
to reduce the default risk.
SUBORDINATE DEBT, DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND MARKET ORIENTED MONITORING OF BANKS
Gaurav Singh CHAUHAN and Satyam S. SUNDARAM
The paper presents a model of a bank with
endogenous risk choices, where delegated
monitoring by subordinate debt helps to
contain risk shifting by banks in the
presence of deposit insurance. While there
are individual shortcomings in these
instruments, their joint featuring to
stabilise banks is deemed complementary in
this paper. While deposit insurance can
increase welfare for uninformed depositors
and helps in averting information based
bank runs, active monitoring by subordinate
debt can counter moral hazard associated
with deposit insurance. The model
developed here explores conditions which
can lead banks to choose the risk consistent
with the risk chosen by a social planner as
ﬁrst best.
The model builds on previous studies and
envisages an active market for subordinate
debt which can continuously impart signals
to the regulators and other at-risk
stakeholders. This provides the necessary
discipline for banks so that they may
conform to solvency consistent behaviour.
While active monitoring is a precondition to
achieve the ﬁrst best, it can be ensured by
inducing stronger interest on part of
subordinate debt holders to monitor bank
risk. A market in these securities,
therefore, is deemed vital which further
enables the incorporation of the risk
assessment by subordinate debt into the
objective functions of banks.
The model also depicts the relevance of
subordinate debt in eliminating the
distortions in deposit insurance pricing.
Speciﬁcally, subordinate debt helps in
checking the risk shifting incentives even
when the insurer charges a premium other
than the ﬁrst best, while completely
eliminating these incentives where optimal
quantities of subordinate debt are chosen.
Importantly, the paper also argues that
subordinate debt can induce incentives for
counter-cyclical asset allocation by banks
for their risky portfolios.
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